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Comment: Classifier Technology and
the Illusion of Progress
Robert A. Stine
It is my pleasure to contribute to the discussion of
this paper. David Hand has the credibility one needs
to write such an article and not have it dismissed
out of Hand. Along with publishing numerous pa-
pers and books on classification and data mining, he
“works in the trenches” with real data. His contribu-
tions to credit modeling are particularly well known
and respected, and his knowledge of that domain
reaches far deeper into the substance than the casual
illustration often chosen to show off a new methodol-
ogy. He is a fascinating lecturer and I have learned a
great deal by listening carefully to his ideas. When
he writes that claims of the superiority of neural
networks and support vector machines “fail to take
account of important aspects of real problems,” I
have to stop and think about my own research and
experiences.
The thrust of Hand’s paper is the argument that
most recent developments in classification, say any-
thing since Fisher’s linear discriminant function, of-
fer little benefit in practice. The mismatch between
theory and practice dwarfs incremental claims for
superiority established in theorems. For instance,
theory that shows that a support vector machine
classifies better than a simple linear model is an “il-
lusion,” bordering on sophistry.
I have a great deal of sympathy for this point of
view, but I doubt that many statisticians will change
what they do after reading this paper. I agree with
many of his criticisms, but I am already in the choir.
I suspect that it will take quite a bit more to con-
vince others, particularly along the lines of proposals
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for what ought to be done. Consider the impact of
Tukey’s “The future of data analysis” (Tukey, 1962).
After chastising the field for its preoccupation with
“optimization in terms of a precise, similarly inad-
equate criterion,” Tukey proposed alternatives, in-
cluding exploratory data analysis and robust meth-
ods. Forty years later, Hand’s criticisms echo his
concerns.
Hand presents a range of criticisms of modern
classifiers. I find it useful to organize my discussion
by grouping them into two clusters:
• Creeping incrementalism
• Square pegs in round holes.
Let me start with the first of these.
Creeping incrementalism. Hand argues that con-
cerns for optimality emphasize tiny improvements
that are dwarfed by other issues in real applications.
He argues that the first predictor or the most simple
of models finds most of the structure. Adding bells
and whistles contributes little more than complex
window dressing, and the advantages are illusions
that disappear during the application. The argu-
ment is analogous to saying that linear Taylor se-
ries make pretty good approximations to most func-
tions; generally, you do not need those messy, higher
order terms. I certainly agree that simple models—
or at least simple methodologies—take you a long
way. Dean Foster and I wrote a paper to make just
this point when mining financial data: with a few
adjustments, stepwise linear regression can predict
bankruptcy as well as elaborate trees (Foster and
Stine, 2004).
A convincing argument for preferring simpler mod-
els requires careful discussions of applications. Given
the depth of his experience, I had expected Hand to
offer a rich portfolio of examples that demonstrate
the failures of complex models. Instead, he relies
more on an idealized example (one of equally corre-
lated predictors) and a summary of fitted models to
selected data sets from the repository at UC Irvine.
One has to be careful basing arguments on made-up
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examples, because it is too easy to turn the exam-
ples around. With equally correlated predictors, the
first one or two predictors capture most of the sig-
nal, with diminishing benefits left to the others. Al-
though I have had similar experiences modeling real
data, it is all too easy to make up normal models
in which later variables appear to explain the most
variation. For example, define
X1 = τY + ε1 + ε2,
X2 = τY + ε1 − ε2,
X3 = τY − ε1 + ε3,
X4 = τY − ε1 − ε3,
where Y, εi
i.i.d.
∼ N(0,1).(1)
Each predictor Xj has equal correlation τ with Y
and the predictors have a block structure. In this
setting, what happens as we greedily expand the re-
gression model is shown in Table 1. With τ = 0.25,
we have superadditive growth in the fit of the model:
the addition of a subsequent predictor adds more to
the model than any predecessor. I am not claiming
that this example is more natural than the one in
the paper. That is not the point. The point is that,
separated from a real application, it is easy to con-
struct examples that support any argument. What
matters is what is useful in practice, and we need to
see more evidence from real applications to appreci-
ate the flaws of complex models.
I think that one needs to “go easy” when it comes
to criticism of the use of statistical inference to judge
improvements in a model. Inferential statistics con-
cerns the separation of even a little signal from noise.
This perspective is ideally suited to applications in
traditional science. Discovery of statistically signif-
icant anomalies from the standard theory is im-
portant. A statistically significant anomaly, even a
small one, cannot be dismissed as random variation
and leads to revisions of the current theory. How-
ever, there needs to be a current theory in the first
Table 1
Number of
predictors
Explained variation
τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5
0 0 0
1 1
1+2/τ2
= 0.03 0.11
2 1
1+1/(2τ2)
= 0.11 0.33
3 1
1+1/(5τ2)
= 0.24 0.55
4 1 1
place. Without an established point of reference,
the yardstick used to gauge improvements should be
different. Most real applications lack such a bench-
mark and resemble an entirely new domain. When
I was first learning about the connection between
statistics and information theory, I was interested
in the use of statistical models for data compres-
sion. (Think of tools used to compress the files on
your computer disk.) Early on, improvements to al-
gorithms for data compression regularly brought re-
ductions of 20 or 30% in the amount of disk space
required to store a data file. As the area matured,
the gains got smaller and issues of statistical sig-
nificance became relevant. Statistical significance in
this context amounts to resolving whether you can
save two or three more bits!
It is also important to establish what it means for
a model to be better than another. Statistical signifi-
cance offers one scale, but it may be poorly suited to
the task. Finding an acceptable alternative can be
particularly hard (e.g., in the social sciences), but
is often easy in business. In business, improvements
generally get measured in dollars, and statistical sig-
nificance seldom guarantees much in the way of eco-
nomic benefits. This point needs to be stressed as
prominently and concretely as possible. Hand dis-
cusses the choice of the loss function used to judge
classifiers and rightfully criticizes the casual use of
error rates. Unfortunately, the survey of fitted mod-
els summarized in his Table 1, however, compares
error rates. Who is to say that a small improvement
in predictive accuracy is not valuable? Consider the
data set “Segmentation” in the first row of his Ta-
ble 1. Perhaps the reduction in the error rate from
0.083 to 0.014 is worth quite a lot of money. With-
out deeper insights into these applications, I cannot
judge whether the improvements are impressive or
unimportant. I doubt that enough is known about
these applications to set costs, but perhaps Hand
could offer other examples from his own experience
in which the costs are known.
Square peg in the round hole. Statistics has rightly
been criticized for often devoting too much energy to
unrealistic problems. As Tukey pointed out, “Better
to have an approximate answer to the right ques-
tion than the exact answer to the wrong question.”
Knowing the right question, however, often means
knowing more about the application than most of
us get from clients. In working with banks on credit
modeling, the proprietary nature of their business
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makes it nearly impossible for them to be able to
disclose enough for me to think that I am answering
the right question. That does not mean that I have
stopped trying, but it gets painful to jam your foot
in the door over and over. It can be a lot more sat-
isfying to prove a theorem or write code for a new
algorithm.
Another reason for solving the wrong problem is
that by the time one has the data and builds a
model, the problem has changed. I would push to the
front of the line to agree with Hand that changes in
the underlying population pose a serious problem.
This problem is particularly acute in business be-
cause of its competitive environment. If a company
builds a model that produces a change in its behav-
ior (such as a better way to evaluate the risk of loans
that it makes), you can be sure that the competition
will react and change as well.
I recently had a first-hand experience with this
type of problem. The task was to help a company im-
prove the methods that it uses to evaluate prospec-
tive employees. Based on attributes known at the
time of an application, we developed a classifier that
was able to identify those most likely to succeed. The
usual sorts of validation exercises showed that the
effects we found were real, at least for the population
represented by our data. As pointed out by Hand in
Section 3, it takes a long time to get the data needed
for this type of modeling. In our case, we had to
wait and see which employees succeeded before we
got the response. The delay was two years. By the
time that the company tried to use the model, the
economy had changed and the nature of the peo-
ple applying for jobs had shifted. In fact, because
we identified certain factors as important, the com-
pany changed the way that it collected these factors,
rearranging the application form to emphasize the
presentation of the key questions. I have little doubt
that the revised questions measure different things
than those used to build our model. Our model was
a disappointment, but then I doubt that any model
would have handled these disruptions.
I owe a favorite example of how the use of a model
changes the population to Professor Hand. Suppose
we are building a model to score the credit-worthiness
of our customers. We discover that customers who,
like me, drive white cars are poor risks. As a re-
sult, we stop offering loans to those driving white
cars. Now think about what happens in several years
when it is time to refresh the scoring model. By this
time, none of our customers drives a white car, so
this characteristic no longer appears to be a risk fac-
tor. Our successor will have to learn this all over
again—that is, if these drivers have not changed
their color preference. In the utopian world of re-
peated sampling from the population, these things
do not happen. The population does not change be-
cause you start to use a model.
What next? Einstein once remarked, “Everything
should be made as simple as possible, but not sim-
pler.” Given a preference for simple models, I would
very much like for Hand to offer some guidance suited
to applications on how one is supposed to decide
whether it is useful to look for more structure. If
not by the ruler given by statistical inference, then
how? In my toy example, the sumX1+X2+X3+X4
predicts Y perfectly. What should we do, however,
when we have a wide data set with relatively few
cases and 1000 predictors? How would we know to
try the sum of them all as a predictor? Stepwise
methods that build up models are good at finding
subadditive models, but superadditive structures are
difficult to identify. Similarly, we have methods that
capture nonlinear features in data, but how are we to
know whether to try them? If we only look for simple
models, then we will always find simple models. To
find nonlinearities requires that we entertain models
that allow them. For example, our regression model
for predicting bankruptcy uses interactions that, in
effect, segment the population. Without them, the
predictions were much less able to predict bankrupt-
cies and left a lot of money on the table (Foster and
Stine, 2004).
Professor Hand has had more experience with the
challenges of dealing with real applications than most
statisticians. I would be very interested in his ap-
proach to deciding when additions to a simple model
are worthwhile. Similarly, what are his thoughts on
methods to assess population drift? Certainly, statis-
ticians have been concerned about population drift
for a long time. For example, consider the article
by Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975) on detecting
changes in a linear model, Kalman filters that ex-
plicitly model an evolving state variable or models
for evolutionary time series dating back to Priestley
(1965). Do these fail in practice?
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